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IN 'niE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
LOREN CRAIG SIMS, 
Def endant-Appell,ant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12966 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case was a criminal action brought by the State 
of Utah against defendant-appellant, Loren Craig Sims, 
charging him with the crime of rape in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, section 76-53-15. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the Third Judicial District, 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 28th 
day of October, 1971, the jury found the defendant-appel-
lant guilty of rape. On December 3, 1971, defendant-
appellant was sentenced to be confined in the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming the 
verdict and judgment rendered by the jury at the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent agrees with the facts as set forth in 
appellant's brief, with the following additions and cor-
rections. 
1. There is a question with regard to the time se-
quence of events after the defendant and Miss Link came 
down Mill Creek Canyon. Miss Link testified that after 
coming down Millcreek Canyon, she and the appellant 
arrived at Lew Arnold's house at 11: 30 p.m. or 12:00 a.m. 
(T. 96) and stayed there about an hour. They then left 
the Arnold house and arrived at Miss Link's boyfriend's 
house at 1: 00 a.m. (T. 97). Her boyfriend was not home 
and Miss Link requested that Sims take her home. Sims 
requested that they go by his shop because he feared that 
it might have been burglarized. They arrived at Sims' 
shop at 1:30 a.m. (T. 99). They didn't go to any other 
residences between the time they left her boyfriend's 
house and they arrived at Sims' shop (T. 132, 133). The 
jury verdict would indicate their acceptance of the above 
rather than defendant's statement. 
2. When they arrived at the shop, no light<; were 
on (T. 99). Sims unlocked the door and asked Miss Link 
to come inside with him because he was afraid (T. 100). 
Sims told Miss Link to go in front of him (T. 101). She 
started walking in front of Sims and was hit on the head 
several times and fell to the floor unconscious. She heard 
nothing before she was hit (T. 101, 103). When she came 
to, she was aware that her pants were down and that two 
buttons were tom off of them (T. 104). She also testi-
fied that she wasn't in the same location in the shop as 
when she had collapsed (T. 104). 
3. Vlhen she came to, Sims told her that burglars 
had hit her. She responded that she thought Sims had 
struck her (T. 104). 
4. Sims made contradictory statements to the court 
and to police officers with regard to the above mentioned 
incident. 
(a) Harold Lee Robinson, who, at the time the 
alleged rape took place, was a police officer for the Salt 
Lake City Police Department, testified that Sims told 
him that when he and Miss Link arrived at his shop, the 
third time, the lights were on and the padlock on the 
door was open, but the hasp was closed. Robinson fur-
ther testified that Sims told him (Robinson) that he 
(Sims) went into the shop, turned off the lights, locked 
the door and returned to the car. Robinson testified that 
Sims told him he felt impressed to return to the shop 
and that Miss Link accompanied him, because she was 
scared and didn't want to stay in the car (T. 26-287) . 
(b) Richard A. Johnson, a police officer for Salt 
Lake City, testified that Sims told him that when he and 
Miss Link arrived at his shop, the lights were on and the 
door was open. Johnson testified that Sims told him he 
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turned off the lights and was going to lock the door when 
Miss Link came up beside him. Sims then told Officer 
Johnson he decided to go into the shop, whereupon he 
was hit and shoved down without losing consciousness. 
He told Officer Johnson that he immediately got up, 
helped Miss Link in to the car and took her to the hos-
pital (T. 260). 
( c) Lee Price, a Salt Lake City police officer, testi· 
fied that Sims told him that on the third visit to his shop, 
as he arrived, he noticed that the door was open and the 
lights were on. Sims then said that he went inside, 
checked around, turned off the lights, locked the door 
and left. Price testified that Sims stated he then went 
back to the car, decided something was wrong, and re-
turned to the shop with Miss Link where, upon unlock· 
ing the door, he was struck. Sims himself testified, with 
regard to these events, that he drove to the shop and the 
lights were out and the door was ajar. Miss Link got 
out of the car with him. The hasp was not shut, and he 
didn't see the lock (T. 101) . 
( d) In another instance, Sims denied that any 
statement was made to him about a sexual attack on 
Miss Link until some time after December 5, 1973. Lee 
Price testified, however, that he told Sims on December 
5 1973 that Miss Link had said she had been raped (T. 
' ' 266). Harold Lee Robinson testified that he heard Lee 
Price tell Sims that Miss Link claimed she'd been rapP<l 
(T. 291). 
(5) Miss Link testified that when she awoke in 
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Sims shop, she believed Sims had struck her. She also 
believed that she had been raped (T. 219). 
(6) Dr. Victor Stevenson testified that he ex-
amined Miss Link at approximately 9: 00 a.m. on Decem-
ber 5, 1970, and found mobile sperm in her vagina; that, 
in his medical opinion was deposited there within the 
last 12 hours (T. 164). 
(7) It was established that Sims came by to pick 
Miss Link up at 9: 00 p.m. (T. 86) on December 4, He 
was with her until he took her to the hospital in the early 
morning hours of December 5. Dr. Stevenson made his 
examination of Miss Link at approximately 9: 00 a.m. on 
December 5, 1970. 
(8) Miss Link testified that she was never married 
to Craig Sims and didn't give Sims permission to have 
sexual intercourse with her (T. 502). 
(9) Robert Allen Yockey testified that on or about 
September 15 or 16, 1971 (T. 174), Sims, in a conversa-
tion with him on the third floor of the Salt Lake County 
Jail, told him (Yockey) that he (Sims) had taken a girl 
to his shop, knocked her unconscious, and raped her (T. 
105 or 178). 
(10) Gary Phelps was called to rebut Mr. Yockey's 
testimony. He (Gary Phelps) testified that he had over-
heard a conversation between Sims and Mr. Yockey, in 
which Sims said that he had been jumped in his shop. 
Mr. Phelps testified that this conversation took place 
betv..een September 21, 1971, and October 1, 191, nearly 
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a week after Mr. Y ockey's private conversation with Sims 
on the 15th or 16th of September. 
( 11) Keith Stauffer testified that he interview~ 
Sims on December 7, 1970, in his office at the Metropoli. 
tan Hall of Justice (T. 271). At the time of the in~r 
view, Sims was not a suspect (T. 272) in the presen1 
rape case. During the course of the interview, Stauffer 
advised Sims of his "Miranda rights" (T. 665) because 
his account of the events of December 4 and 5, 1970, wai 
different from that told by Miss Link (T. 278). 
(12) Evidence of injury to Miss Link's breast was 
introduced (T. 111). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE 
STATE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL MADE 
OUT THE ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF 
RAPE AND WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE 
JURY TO RENDER A FINDING OF 
GUILTY. 
The crime of rape is defined in Section 76-53-15, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), as "[A]n act of sexual in· 
tercourse accomplished with a female, not the wife of 
the perpetrator, under any of the following circum· 
stances:" 
( 1) When the female is under the age of 
thirteen years. 
.. 
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(2) Where she is incapable, through lrm-
acy or any other unsormdness of mind, whether 
temporary or pennanent, of giving legal con-
sent. 
(3) Where she resists, but her resistance 
is overcome by force or vioknce. 
( 4) Where she is prevented from resisting 
by threat.s of immediate and great bodily harm, 
accompanied by apparent power of execution, 
or by any intoxicating, narcotic or anaesthetic 
substance administered by or with the privity of 
the accused. 
( 5) When she is at the time unconscious 
of the nature of the act, and this is known to the 
accused. 
(6) Where she submits under the belief 
that the person committing the act is her hus-
band, and this belief is induced by any artifice, 
pretense or concealment practiced by the ac-
cused with intent to induce such belief. (Em-
phasis added) 
The evidence presented by the state showed that the 
defendant Sims violated Section 76-53-15, U. C. A. The 
evidence presented showed that on the morning of De-
cember 5, 1970, Sims (1) requested the prosecutrix to 
precede him into his shop; (2) then struck her over the 
head, rendering her unconscious; (3) and while the prose-
uctrix was in this unconscious state, the defendant Sims 
engaged in sexual intercourse with her against her will. 
The actions of the ddendant clearly fall within the 
proscribed activities set forth in Section 76-53-15, U. C. A. 
(1953), defining the act of rape. 
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Specifically, Miss Link at no time cosented to en-
gage in the act of intercourse with defendant. In ordei 
to overcome her will not to have intercourse with him 
defendant Sims struck her over the head, rendering he; 
unconscious; and thus overcoming her will not to have 
intercourse with him. This action falls within the pro-
hibitions of Subsection 3 of Section 76-53-15, U. C. A 
(1953). 
In addition, at the time intercourse occurred, the 
prosecutrix was unaware of its occurrence. Sims' aci, 
that of knowingly engaging in intercourse with the prose-
cutrix while she was unconscious of the nature of the act, 
falls within the proscribed activitiey set forth in Subsec· 
tion 5 of Section 76-53-15, U. C. A. (1953). There was 
ample evidence before the jury to prove the elements 
of the crime of rape. 
Utah courts deem the uncorroborated testimony of 
the prosecutrix sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict (See 
State v. Rees, 43 Utah 447, 135 P. 270 (1913); State v. 
Boyes, 47 Utah 474, 155 P. 335 (1916); State v. Miles, 
122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211 (1952); State v. Hodges, 14 
Utah 2d 197, 381 P. 2d 81 (1963)). It goes without say· 
ing that such uncorroborated testimony is sufficient to 
make out the elements of the crime. 
The prosecutrix testified that upon regaining con· 
sciousness, after being struck in Sims' shop, she found 
her pants down and two buttons were off of them. She 
then testified that she believed Sims had both struck 
her and raped her (T. 104). 
.. 
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Although sufficient alone to sustain a conviction, the 
prosecutrix's testimony was corroborated by the follow-
ing: ( 1) she was treated for massive head injuries at 
the L. D. S. Hospital on the morning of December 5, 
1970; (2) a picture of the prosecutrix's injured breast 
was introduced into evidence (T. 111) - she previously 
testified that prior to her date with Sims, her breast had 
not been injured (T. 104) - (3) Dr. Victor Stevenson 
testified that he performed a pelvic exam of Pauline Link 
at 9: 00 a.m. on December 5, 1970. During the course of 
this exam, he found mobile sperm in the prosecutrix's 
vagirni. He further testified that in hi<; best medical 
judgment, this spermatazoa had been deposited by means 
of intercourse within the previous 12 hours (T. 163-164). 
The prosecutrix had previously testified that she had not 
engaged in sexual intercourse for the previous five or six 
days (T. 485). This excluded the possibility that the 
spermatazoa was deposited in the prosecutrix by means 
of intercourse with someone other than Sims. The prose-
cutri.x also testified that she was not married to the de-
fendant and that she had never consented to have inter-
course with him. The state's evidence clearly made out 
the crime of rape as set forth in Section 76-53-15, U. C. A. 
(1953). 
Appellant would have this court believe that the 
evidence presented by the state was also insufficient to 
sustain a verdict of guilty. In State v. Laub, 102 Utah 
402, 131 P. 2d 805 (1942), this court articulated the rule 
tn be followed when questions of the sufficiency of the 
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evidence are raised. Justice Wolfe, m speaking for a 
unanimous court, said: 
Whik the State's evidence is circumstan-
tial, such evidence may lie just as conclusive or 
even more so than direct evidence, but the prose-
cution still has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Or 
stated another way, the prosecution must "not 
only show by a preponderance of evidence that 
an offense was committed, and that the alleged 
facts and circumstances are true, but they must 
also be such facts and circumstances as are in-
compatible, upon any reasonable hypothesis, 
with the innocence of the accused, and incapable 
of explanation upon any reasonable hypothesis 
other than the defendant's guilt." People v. 
Scott, 10 Utah 217, 37 P. 335 ... As pointed out 
in Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Fourth Edi-
tion, page 21, "All the circumstances as proved 
must be consistent with each other, and they 
are to be taken together as proved. Being con-
sistent with each other and taken together, they 
must point surely and unerringly in the direc-
tion of guilt. * * *" 131 P. 2d at 807. (Em-
phasis added.) 
The evidence presented by the state was incompatible 
with any other finding than that Sims: (1) took the 
prosecutrix to his shop; (2) requested that she precede 
him into the shop; (3) struck her over the head; (4) 
raped her and ( 5) made up a story of robbery t.o cover 
the crime. 
The following evidence supports this hypothesis: 
( 1) Miss Link testified that Sims unlocked the door or 
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the shop and requested that she precede him inside (T. 
101); (2) she testified she was struck on the head from 
behind (the location of the defendant) and fell uncon-
scious to the floor (T. 101); (3) when she gained con-
sciousness she testified that her pants were down below 
her knees and some of the buttons had been tom off 
(T. lQc!); (4) she testified that at that time she believed 
she had been struc~~ on the head and raped by Sims (T. 
104); (5) the finding of spermatazoa by Dr. Stevenson 
during a pelvic exam of Miss Link (T. 163); (6) the in-
consistent and conflicting statements made by Sims 1;o 
police officers with regard 1;o the alleged burglary of his 
shop. From this evidence, a jury could and did find be-
yond a reasonable doubt that the defendant raped the 
prosecutrix (see Statement of Facts) . 
It is unlikely (if not improbable) that Sims and 
Miss Link were struck over the head by burglars at Sims' 
shop, as appellant maintains. There was no evidence of 
a forced entry, i.e., no damage to the locks, doors or win-
dows of the shop; no reported loss of property nor signs 
of a struggle or fight. 
It is just as illogical to believe that Miss Link would 
fabricate a rape story in order to explain away evidence 
of sexual intercourse with her boyfriend when the pelvic 
exam which showed that intercourse had taken place was 
only performed after allegations of rape were made by 
Miss Link. Had Miss Link not claimed rape during the 
examination of her head wounds, the pelvic exam would 
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not have been conducted; and the fact that intercourse 
had taken place would not have been established. 
The possibility of any other reasonable hypothesil 
being foreclosed, the jury was justified in concluding, as 
they did, that Miss Link had been raped by the defen. 
dant Sims. 
Even if more than one reasonable inference coula 
be drawn from the evidence, this court, in State v. That· 
clwr, 108 Utah 63, 157 P. 2d 258 (1945), stated that 
"where different reasonable inferences can be drawn 
from the evidence, the question is one exclusively within 
the providence of the jury" - Id. at 68. The evidence 
being more than adequate to sustain the finding of fact 
arrived at by the jury, this court should be very reluc-
tant to overturn that jury verdict. 
This point was again articulated by this court m 
State v. Schad, 24 Utah 2d 255, 470 P. 2d 246 (1970). 
The court wrote: 
"[W]here a conviction is based on circum-
stantial evidence, the evidence should be looked 
upon with caution, and that it must exclude 
every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of 
defendant. This is entirely logical, because if 
the jury believes that there is a reasonable hy-
pothesis in the evidence consistent with the de-
fendant's innocence, tlwre would rwturally be 
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Nevertheless, 
that proposition does not apply to each circum· 
stance separately, but is a matter within the 
prerogative of the jury to determine fro~ all of 
the facts and circumstances shown; and if there-
13 
from they are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the defendant's guilt, it necessarily fol-
lows that they regarded the evidence as exclud-
ing every other reasonable hypothesis. Unless 
upon our review of the evidence, and the reason-
able inferences fairly to be deduced therefrom, 
it appears that there is no reasonable basis there-
in for such a conclusion we should not overturn 
the verdict. 470 P. 2d at 247. (Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P. 2d 
183 (1960). 
The jmy had sufficient basis from the evidence pre-
sented at trial to find the defendant guilty of the crime 
of rape beyond a reasonable doubt. This court should, 
therefore, refrain from overturning the findings of the 
jury and should sustain the verdict and judgment of the 
trial court. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED 
TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
CHANGE OF VENUE. 
It is a well settled proposition in Utah case law that 
a change of venue is within the trial court's judicial dis-
cretion and subjected to review only for abuse of such 
discretion. In appellate review of the exercise of this 
discretion, the appellant must satisfy the Supreme Court 
that the trial court exercised its discretion clearly against 
reason and evidence, State v. Smith, 11 Utah 2d 'lB7, 358 
P. 2d 342 (1961) ; State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P. 
2d 478 (1948); State v. Carrow, 64 Utah 87, 228 P. 563 
(1924); State v. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40 P. 2d 961 (1935). 
Respondent submits that appellant has failed to show 
that the trial court exercised such abuse. 
It is recognized that there was publicity commensur. 
ate with the magnitude of the crime. This cannot, and 
should not be eliminated. A mere showing of publicity 
on its own, however, is not sufficient grounds for granting 
a change of venue. The likelihood of prejudice must be 
shown to be so persuasive that it would influence the 
jury and prevent a fair trial. 
The case of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333, 86 
S. Ct. 1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966), cited as support for 
appellant's position involved prejudicial news coverage 
carried to the extreme. 
Much of the material printed or broadcast 
during the trial was never heard from the wit-
ness stand, such as the charges that Sheppard 
had purposely impeded the murder investigation 
and must be guilty since he had hired a promi-
nent criminal lawyer; that Sheppard was a per-
jurer; that he had sexual relations with numer-
ous women; that his slain wife had characterized 
him as a "Jekyll-Hyde"; that he was a "bare-
faced liar" because of his testimony as to a 
police treatment; and, finally, that a woman con· 
vict claimed Sheppard to be the father of her 
illegitimate child. Id. at 356-7. 
Such glaring prejudice is found nowhere is the neWs 
coverage of the Craig Sims trial. 
111e court in Estes v. United States, 335 F. 2d 609 
(5th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 379 U. S. 964, 13 L. Ed. 2d 
1)59, 8[) S. Ct. 656, rehearing den., 380 U. S. 926, 13 L. Ed. 
2d 814, 85 S. Ct. 884, took some reasoning from the Su-
preme Court decision in Beck v. Washington, 369 U. S. 
541, 82 S. Ct. 955, 8 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1962), when they said: 
There was no specific showing of bias and 
prejudice by appellant resulting from the wide-
spread publicity, and the fact alone of such pub-
licity did not in itself constitute a sufficient 
showing of bias and prejudice. 
Appellant cites Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 81 S. Ct. 
1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961), to support his contention. 
A close reading of that case will show that the appellant 
there had become a notorious celebrity in a relatively 
small county - not like appellant in our case. In build-
ing up to their decision in the case the court discussed 
their feelings regarding normal publicity for a criminal 
prosecution. In 366 U. S. at pages 722 and 723 they said: 
It is not required, however, that the jurors 
be t.otally ignorant of the facts and issues in-
volved. In these days of swift, widespread and 
diverse methods of communication, an import-
ant case can be expected to arouse the interest 
of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of 
those best qualified to serve as jurors will not 
have formed some impression or opinion as to 
the merits of the case. This is particularly true 
in criminal cases. To hold that the mere ex-
istence of any preconceived notion as t,o the guilt 
or innocence of an accused, without more, is 
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sufficient to rebut the presumption of a pros-
pective juror's impartiality would be to estab. 
lish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if 
the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion 
and render a verdict based on the evidence pre-
sented in court. Spies v. Illirwis, 123 U. S. 131, 
41 L. Ed. 80, 8 S. Ct. 21, 22; Holt v. United 
States, 218 U. S. 245, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 31 S. Ct. 2, 
20 Ann. Cas. 1138; Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U. S. 145, 155, 25 L. Ed. 244, 246. 
The court is clear in stating that if a juror is aware 
of the facts and even has an opinion regarding them, so 
long as he can lay aside that opinion and render a vet· 
diet on the facts, there has been no reversible error com-
mitted. In Sinclair v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P. 2d 
305 (1967), affirmed, 447 F. 2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971), 
cert. den., 391 U. S. 924 (1968), this court held that the 
fact that jurors may have become aware of purported 
facts of a case through publicity does not disqualify them 
if they can swear to impartiality. See also Sinclair v. 
Turner, 447 F. 2d 1158 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 391 
U.S. 924, 88 S. Ct. 1822, 20 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1968). 
An examination of the trial record shows that the 
judge specifically questioned the potential jurors as to 
whether or not " [ t] hey had seen the defendant's name 
in print" (T. 58) or if they had seen or heard a news re-
port concerning the defendant Sims on the radio or tele· 
vision (T. 58). Finally, the judge asked whether any of 
the jurors had "[a]ny knowledge whatsoever about Mr. 
Sims other than the fact that he is now charged with an 
offense which is to be tried by this court" (T. 58). Those 
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juror.'-' who an::;wered affirmatively to any of the above 
questions were dismissed. As can be readily seen, the 
jury, as finally impaneled, consisted of individuals who 
had not remembered hearing, reading or seeing anything 
with reference to Mr. Sims in the news media. This 
clearly shows a lack of prejudice on the part of the jury. 
To insure as much as possible that once impaneled the 
jury would not be prejudiced, the court further instructed 
the jury, during the course of the trial, to remain aloof 
from all outside influences of publicity (T. 141, 288). 
More specifically, at the request of defense counsel, the 
court reminded and admonished the jury to avoid news-
papers and television in order to avoid obtaining any 
factual information outside of the courtroom (T. 385). 
Respondent submits that in view of the care with 
which the jury was selected and the manner in which the 
trial was conducted, appellant's contention that reversi-
ble error was committed by the trial court in denying 
his motion for a change of venue is without merit and 
should be dismissed accordingly. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW HAS DENIED HIM 
WHEN THE TRIAL JUDGE REFUSED TO 
GRANT HIS MOTION TO DEPOSE THE 
PROSECUTING WITNESS IS A MISSTATE-
MENT OF THE FACTS, SINCE SAID MO-
TION WAS NEVER RULED ON BY THE 
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TRIAL COURT DUE TO DEFENSE COUN-
S E L ' S F A I LURE TO NOTICE IT FOR 
HEARING. 
Appellant erroneously contends that his right ro due 
process of law was denied him when the trial court faileiJ 
to grant his motion to depose the prosecuting witnes& 
Nowhere in the trial record is there evidence that the 
motion was ever heard by Judge Hall. It goes without 
saying that if never heard by the judge, the motion could 
not be denied. 
The motion in question may be f.ound in the trial 
record at page 7. It was admittedly filed on May 18, 
1971, in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office but was 
never docketed or noticed for hearing in the trial courl 
The burden of docketing and noticing obviously falls on 
the party desiring the motion to be heard - namely, 
James N. Barber. 
Respondent respectfully submits that appellant's 
contention in this regard is totally without merit and 
should therefore be ignored. Even if the motion had 
been heard and denied, no error would have been com· 
mitted. The general rule followed by the state courts ol 
Utah is that prior to trial, dfense counsel does not have 
a right to preview the state's evidence. This position 
was articulated by Justice Callister in State v. Faux,~ 
Utah 2d 350, 345 P. 2d 186 (1959). While dissenting on 
another point, he said: 
(A] person charged with a crime by infor-
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mation (rather than by indictment) is not 
afforded the opportunity to preview the prose-
cution's evidence. Id. at 365. 
In the case at bar, the deposing of the prosecutrix cer-
tainly falls within the preview prohibition referred to by 
Justice Callister. This same view has been expressed on 
numerous other occasions. See United States v. Garrison, 
291 F. 646 (1923); Meyers v. State, Tex. Crim. App., 491 
S. W. 2d 412 (1972) ; Reynolds v. State, Ct. of App. Ind., 
292 N. E. 2d 290 (1973). The appellant cites a number 
of cases for the proposition that reversible error is com-
mitted when the prosecution knowingly and purposely 
withhold5 and/ or hides exculpatory evidence or allows 
false evidence to go uncorrected. Napue v. Illinois, 360 
U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. (1959); Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U. S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791 
(1934); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); State v. Thompson, 396 S. W. 
2d 697 (Missouri, 1965). Respondent asserts that these 
cases are inapplicable to the case at bar, since no excul-
patory evidence was withheld by the prosecution. 
Appellant would have this court believe that if he 
had been able to discover the identity of Miss Link's 
boyfriend, he would have been able to impeach her tes-
timony that she had not engaged in sexual intercourse 
for five to six days prior to her date with Sims. Respon-
dent respectfully submits that appellant is merely at-
tempting to create issues for appeal. No evidence has been 
brought forward showing that Cory Jensen, Miss Link's 
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boyfriend, actually did engage in intercourse with tht 
prosecutrix sooner than five days before her date with 
Sims. In addition, defense counsel had ample opportun. 
ity to discover the name and whereabouts of Cory Jensen 
during the preliminary hearing. If the importance of Cory 
.Jensen's testimony was discovered after the preliminary 
hearing, the defendant Sims could have told Mr. Barber 
where Cory lived, since Sims and Miss Link had been a! 
Jensen's residence on December 5, 1970 (T. 97). It would 
have then been a simple task to go to Cory's residenet 
and obtain the supposed "exculpatory evidence." 
The other cases cited by appellant are of little worth, 
since they deal with criminal actions in federal courts. 
Such actions are governed by federal rules of criminal 
procedure, which rules were clearly inapplicable in thi~ 
Utah State Court proceeding. 
POINT IV. 
NO REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS COM· 
MITTED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE IN AL· 
LOWING THE PROSECUTION TO INTRO· 
DUCE INTO EVIDENCE THE CLOTHING 
WORN BY THE PROSECUTRIX AT THE 
TIME SHE WAS RAPED. 
The trial court at its discretion allows evidence con· 
nected with the commission of a crime to be introducea 
if the court is satisfied that the evidence is in substan· 
tially the same condition as at the time the crime wa; 
committed (Sta.te v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P. 20 
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670 ( Hl72) ) . In deciding whether or not to allow evi-
dence to be introduced, the court considers the circum-
stances su1rnunding the preservation and custody of the 
evidence. If, after considering these factors the trial 
comt determines that the items in question are in sub-
stantially the same condition, they may be admitted. In 
the case at bar, the trial court heard testimony from 
which it would and did conclude that the clothing of 
prosecutrix, introduced at trial, was in substantially the 
same condition as it was at the time it was removed from 
her in the L. D. S. Hospital on December 5, 1970. The 
prosecutrix testified that at the time the clothing was 
removed, it was soiled. Specifically, she testified that the 
panties were soiled and dirty when they were taken off 
at the hospital. She then testified that they were in sub-
stantially the same condition - that is, soiled and dirty 
- when they were introduced into evidence in the trial 
court. The trial court was, therefore, satisfied that the 
clothing was in substantially the same condition and, 
therefore, admissible. Any prejudice which may be done 
to defendant's case by the introduction of questionable 
evidence is eliminated, because the jury may disregard 
the evidence if there is doubt as to whether or not the 
article in question is "substantially the same" or if cor-
rect custody procedures were followed. Thus, there ex-
ists a double safeguard assuring that the defendant re-
mains free from any ill effect which may result from the 
introduction of erroneous evidence. 
It appears that, as a consequence of these two safe-
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guards - namely, the trial judge and the jury _ thi, 
court has declined to overturn the ruling of the trial court 
in these matters unless there is a showing of actual abuSt 
of discretion on the part of the trial judge (State v. Mad 
sen, supra, at 111). 
If error was committed, and respondent main. 
tains there was none, such error was so minimal lli 
to fall with the harmless error category. The state'; 
case, even without the admission of the clothing worn 
by the prosecutrix, was strong enough to sustain a verdict 
of guilty. (Review of the sufficiency of the state's e~· 
dence will not be undertaken here in order to conserve 
this court's valuable time. Instead, the court will be r~ 
spectfully referred to the arguments presented in Point 
I of Respondent's Brief.) 
POINT V. 
REVERSIBLE ERROR WAS NOT COM-
MITTED, NOR WAS APPELLANT DENIED 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW BY THE INTRO· 
DUCTION OF THE TESTIMONY OF ROB· 
ERT YOCKEY. 
Appellant asserts that reversible error was coounitted 
by the state in introducing the testimony of Robe~ 
Yockey during the trial proceedings. It appears that 
appellant would have this court assume the responsibil 
ity of the jury and rule on the credibility of a witnes> 
Such a position is clearly contrary to the position taken 
by this honorable court. In State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah Ji 
110, 307 P. 2d 212 (1957) at 114, this court said: 
-
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The very essence of a trial by jury is that 
the jury are the exclusive judges of the weight 
of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses 
and the facts to be found therefrom. 
Clearly, it is the prerogative of the jury to determine 
fact from fiction, truth from falsehood. To usurp this 
jury function would undermine the very foundation of 
criminal justice. 
If Mr. Robert Yockey's testimony was as "[o]bvi-
ously fabricated" (Appellant's Brief - P. 81) as appel-
lant maintains, defense counsel should have had no trou-
ble discrediting such testimony under cross examination 
or introducing rebutting testimony. Such is the purpose 
of the adversary system of the law. Any attack on the 
quality of testimony should be made in the trial before 
the trier of fact to insure the proper functioning of that 
system. 
Appellant points out inconsistency in Mr. Y ockey's 
testimony in order to discredit him or show that his tes-
timony is tainted. Respondent asserts that very few 
inconsistencies exist and those that do exist can be easily 
explained. Contrary to what appellant would have this 
court believe, Mr. Yockey did not say that Sims had 
sprained his ankle. Rather, Yockey indicated that Sims 
may have said his ankle was hurting (T. 183). Further, 
appellant asserts that Yockey testified Miss Link had 
a broken leg as a result of the rape (Appellant's Brief -
P. 28). The trial transcript does not contain such testi-
mony. To the contrary, Yockey admitted that he was 
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not sure and couldn't remember if Sims had even rela~a 
such a fact (T. 1813) . 
Although Yockey did testify that Sims told him he 
called the police from his shop, this inconsistency, when 
reviewed in the context of the entire testimony, does no! 
viewed in the context of the entire testimony, does not 
prevaricator or liar, as appellant maintains. If mere in· 
consistencies render testimony inadmissible, and the in. 
clusion of such testimony, reversible error, the testimony 
of Mark Richmond should be excluded also. Rather, in· 
consistencies go to the credibility of the witness. In State 
v. Jarett, 112 Utah 335, 178 P. 2d 547 (1947), at 340, thil 
court said: 
However these uncertainties and inconsist-
ent statements go only to the credibility of the 
witnesses, and to the weight to be given to their 
testimony. These are properly matters for the 
jury's determination and we assume were con-
sidered by the jury during its deliberation. 
Appellant further cites numerous cases for the prop-
osition that the knowing use of perjured testimony is 
reversible error. Respondent submits that not only has 
appellant failed to show that the S'tate knowingly used 
perjured testimony but has failed to show that perjure.1 
testimony was used. Respondent therefore respectfully 
submits that no reversible error was committed in intro· 
ducing the testimony of Robert Yockey. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
--
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REFUSING TO ADMIT THE TESTIMONY 
OF JACK BRADY CONCERNING THE 
PROSECUTRIX'S RE PUT AT I 0 N FOR 
CHASTITY, SINCE SUCH TESTIMONY 
WAS NOT RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES OF 
FACT OR LAW BEFORE THE COURT AND 
JURY. 
The general rule regarding the admissibility of evi-
dence concerning the prosecutrix's reputation for chas-
tity in rape proceedings, is that such evidence is admissi-
ble if consent is raised as a defense. 
This view was expressed by this court in State v. 
Scott, 55 Utah 553, 118 P. 860 (1920) at 563: 
In view that the defendant denied that he 
was with the prosecutrix on the night in ques-
tion, and denied that he had had sexual inter-
course with her then or at any time, we can-
not conceive how such evidence had any rele-
vancy in this case, except perhaps to affect the 
credibility of the prosecutrix. 
A similar view has been adopted in other jurisdic-
tions. In Peopl,e v. Gabler, 111 Ill. App. 2d 121, 249 N. E. 
2d 340 (1969), the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the 
trial court's refusal to admit testimony of the prosecuting 
witness's reputation for chastity, saying: 
The reputation for chastity in a rape case 
is only material where the defense is cnosent. 
Id. at 343. 
• 
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A similar view was expressed in Peop/,e v. Cox, 383 Ill 
Ill. 617, 622, 50 N. E. 2d 758; Shepard v. State, Okl. Cr, 
437 P. 2d 565, 600 (1967); Jackson V. State, 470 s. w.~ 
201 (Tex. 1971). In applying these holdings to the cw. 
at bar, it is clear that no error was committed, sin~ 
clearly, the issue of consent was never raised by the d~ 
fendant. In fact, defendant denies that intercourse even 
occurred. The reason for the existence of such a rule~ 
clear. While the prosecutrix's reputation for chastity E 
material when the issue of consent is raised, the prejG 
dicial effect that such evidence has absent the issue o: 
consent far outweighs any purpose to be served by it 
introduction. To confuse the issue before the jury wi~ 
the sensationalism which accompanies testimony of tlJi; 
type would compound the difficulties inherent in crim 
inal rape proceedings. Rule 45, Rules of Evidence, vest 
with the trial judge the authority to exclude the type ol 
testimony in question here if "he finds that the probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the risk that I~ 
admission will (b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice or of confusing the issues of misleading the 
jury ... " (Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence). As pre~· 
ously stated, this court will overturn the ruling of a trial 
judge to admit evidence only if the judge has abused hil 
discretion. See State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 49H 
2d 670 (1972). For the same reason, the ruling of th< 
trial judge to exclude testimony should carry the saJlll 
presumption of correctness. 
Appellant contends that the testimony of Jack Brad' 
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was necessary to show that Sims had no reason to strike 
or rape Miss Link in order to have sexual relations with 
her. His testimony was to rebut the State's contention 
that Sims assaulted and raped Miss Link because she 
had refused to have intercourse with him. For this pur-
pose (that of rebutting the State's presumption and help-
ing to establish an alternative reasonable hypothesis) 
Jack Brady's testimony was of little value. Even with 
the addition of Mr. Brady's testimony, there was no other 
reasonable hypothesis other than that Sims took Miss 
Link to his shop, struck her over the head and raped her 
because she refused to have intercourse with him. The 
allegation that a robbery had occurred was not supported 
by the facts and evidence introduced at trial. The allega-
tion that Mrs. Link accused Sims of rape because she 
was afraid her parents would find out about the sexual 
relations she had had with her boyfriend is illogical, since 
the evidence of sexual intercourse only came to light 
after a pelvic exam was performed. That same pelvic 
exam was performed only after the prosecutrix claimed 
she had been raped. Had she not claimed rape, the pelvic 
exam would not have been performed, and she would 
only have been treated at the hospital for the injuries 
she sustained as a result of the assault. Any function 
to be served by Jack Brady's testimony was served by 
the prosecutrix herself when she openly admitted in court 
that she had engaged in sexual intercourse with her boy-
friend, Cory. That coupled with the fact that she accepted 
a date with Sims, a person she didn't know and had never 
;:een, drank with him and parked with him, gave the jury 
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a reasonable indication of the prosecutrix's reputation b 
chastity and also her credibility. The testimony of Jad 
Brady was not only prejudicial to the proceedings am1, 
therefore, excluded but also is unnecessary to est.ablisn 
either the reputation of the prosecutrix or her credibilicy, 
For the aforementioned reason, the testimony of Jar.( 
Brady was correctly excluded from the trial proceedingi. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons heretofore presented, respondenl 
prays this court sustain the jury verdict of guilty. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-ResponderJ 
